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Over 60 years ago the first political science 
professor at Wellington’s Victoria University, 
Leslie Lipson, noted in his 1948 The Politics  
of  Equality that:
With the political parties the modern [New Zealand] 
civil service has struck a mutually beneficial bargain. 
By guaranteeing to public servants a life’s career and a 
pension, parties have foresworn the use of  patronage and 
have guaranteed to the state’s employees their tenure of  
their jobs. In return the parties expect, and the public 
servants owe, equal loyalty to any government which the 
people have placed in office. (Lipson, 1948, p.479)
A quarter of  a century later, Bernard Schaffer defined the 
‘Public Service Bargain’ that applied to Whitehall civil servants 
in broadly similar terms. For Schaffer, in return for agreeing 
to ‘anonymity, some sacrifice of  political rights and proficient 
performance’, British civil servants were assured ‘prominent 
careers, honours and a six-hour working day when the middle 
classes wanted just that, and neutrality was possible, credible 
and inexpensive’. Schaffer suggested how the Whitehall 
model of  a competent, neutral and serially loyal civil service 
was underpinned by ‘some quite peculiar conditions and, as it 
were, a highly complicated bargain’. Given the nature of  the 
‘highly complicated bargain’, Schaffer also noted the incentive 
of  the various parties to ‘shuffle out’ of  their (usually implicit) 
obligations under the Bargain (Schaffer, 1973, p.252).
In the late noughties of  the 21st century, there is little to 
suggest that the Bargain is still regarded as ‘mutually beneficial’. 
While Lipson and Schaffer would still recognise the idea of  
serial loyalty in both the New Zealand and UK systems, the 
reward side of  the Bargain has changed considerably, in 
particular in New Zealand. Drawing on experiences across 
different national systems, one can point to at least three 
dimensions under which the Bargain seems to be under strain 
across different jurisdictions and different state traditions:
• On the reward side, public servants criticise the fact that 
they were asked to turn away from the tenured life of  
material security with the promise of  adequate material 
compensation for the heightened risk premium. They 
note how they have been left behind in an ever-increasing 
pay differential in comparison with the top of  the private 
sector. This cheating on the material side of  the Bargain 
was made official with the move, in both New Zealand 
and the UK, to make material reward no longer market-
facing, but wider public service-facing. At the same time, 
critical voices point to unclear assessment and promotion 
criteria and low guarantees of  reward for outstanding 
performance. On the other side of  the Bargain, politicians 
moan about the risk-averse nature of  public servants and 
the lack of  performance management systems to make 
public servants responsive.
• On the competency side, public servants across 
countries complain about being shouldered aside by 
new generations of  political advisers, especially at the 
centre of  government. Gone are the days in which public 
servants could claim monopoly status as sages and policy 
wonks in government. Instead, life at the top of  the civil 
service has increasingly meant attention to organisational 
detail and ‘delivery’, somewhat disheartening if  the 
main attraction of  a civil service career was being at the 
heart of  decision making. On the other side, politicians, 
faced by laptop and USB memory stick losses, failures in 
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social security payments or procurement of  information 
technologies, or the publication of  embarrassing details 
on government websites, suggest that competence in the 
context of  bureaucracy is, at best, a misnomer. They 
point to the lack of  bureaucratic responsiveness to the 
political demands of  a 24/7 media landscape and the 
need to govern through well-targeted leaking. Critical 
of  the advisory and delivery skills of  their civil servants 
or the particularly ‘econocratic’ nature of  policy advice, 
they ask for more ‘delivery’ skills of  their administrative 
machine, while looking for expertise on substance and 
presentation elsewhere.
• On the loyalty side the bargain is under pressure too. 
Whereas in the past, public servants would assume 
that ministers would take the flack for decisions, in the 
contemporary world civil servants are outed and publicly 
criticised, without public servants having the formal right 
to respond. On the other side of  the bargain, politicians 
are openly dismissive not just of  the idea of  ‘serial loyalty’, 
and suspect ‘disloyalty’ on the side of  their public servants. 
Such views are particularly prominent among politicians 
who have spent considerable time on opposition benches, 
as was observed in New Zealand post-1999 or Germany 
after the election of  the Social Democrat–Green coalition 
in 1998. In Canada, too, the government of  John Harper 
was seen as openly questioning the loyalty of  the civil 
servants, with headlines suggesting that ‘Harper sees a 
liberal under every federal bed’ (Globe and Mail, 19 January 
2006, p.A18).1 But the scepticism regarding the loyalty 
of  civil servants goes much further. For example, David 
Blunkett in his diaries of  his time as a Cabinet minister 
during the Blair administration noted that ‘we have a 
situation in my department where virtually anything of  
any importance is leaked … The civil service are very 
lucky that we can’t sack them, that no one can sack them’ 
(Guardian, 13 October 2006, diary entry for February 
2002). Even more publicly, Gordon Brown, just before his 
move to 10 Downing Street, was condemned by a former 
Cabinet Secretary as having ‘Stalinist ruthlessness’ and a 
‘Macavity quality. He is nowhere when there is dirty work 
to be done’ (Financial Times, 20 March 2007). 
After over two decades of  administrative reform, the 
‘mutually beneficial bargain’ has not only changed, but also 
appears to be in considerable trouble, way beyond the usual 
boundary-policing issues about what are partisan political 
or government activities. Something more significant seems 
to have happened to Schaffer’s ‘peculiar conditions’ that 
made the operation of  traditional Public Service Bargains 
possible. Public Service Bargains set out the terms of  the 
relationship between public servants and the wider political 
system, especially with politicians. As with all relationships, 
the rules of  engagement are only to some extent written 
down, but are also based on implicit assumptions and 
conventions. Consequently, where to draw the line between 
the ‘appropriate’ and the ‘inappropriate’ often remains 
unknown, unless one has overstepped that boundary. 
Furthermore, these boundary lines are subject to changing 
interpretations (see Hood and Lodge, 2006). Much has 
been written about how we got here, but what is the future 
direction of  travel?
What future for the Public Service Bargain(s)?
New Zealand is widely regarded as a prominent case of  
administrative reform, having moved to a system in which 
the public servant’s ‘life’s career and pension’ are no longer 
guaranteed, but where the ‘serial loyalty’ understanding of  
enthusiastic work for the government of  
the day has remained. Furthermore, the 
wider rules of  the game have changed, 
in particular with the introduction of  
MMP in 1996. So what is the future of  
the Public Service Bargain? How can the 
Public Service Bargain be made ‘fit for 
purpose for the 21st century’, a phrase 
so commonly used by those involved in 
UK civil service reform debates? 
One option, the ‘back to the future’ option of  returning 
to ‘constitutional principles’ and regarding the last decade 
of  increased boundary testing by politicians as a deviation 
that requires correction, seems problematic. On the one 
hand, in particular in the case of  New Zealand, this raises 
the question of  which ‘back to the future’ states of  the world 
these critics aspire to: first, whether this applies to the world 
of  pre-MMP or not; and, second, whether their prescription 
applies to the world of  the 1912 Public Service Act that was 
at the heart of  Lipson’s account, or the ‘pure’ world of  the 
1988 reforms that maintained serial loyalty, but radically 
changed the reward side of  the Bargain. Politics (especially 
post-MMP) and society have arguably moved on, thereby 
changing the ‘quite peculiar conditions’ that allowed for the 
endurance of  traditional Bargains. For example, in the UK, 
devolution has changed the context in which a unified civil 
service for all the territories of  Great Britain operates, even 
though contemporary debates do their best to ignore this 
issue.
Another option would be to do nothing. Bargains might 
have sufficient self-healing capacities. Should one party 
to the Bargain stray too far from the explicit and implicit 
understandings, the other party will respond. For example, 
attacks on the competency and loyalty of  civil servants will be 
answered by a range of  responses, ranging from increasingly 
risk-averse policy advice and implementation to the discrete 
Strained or Broken? The Future(s) of the Public Service Bargain
As with all relationships, the rules of engagement 
are only to some extent written down, but are  
also based on implicit assumptions and 
conventions.
Policy Quarterly – Volume 5, Issue 1 – February 2009 – Page 55
dissemination of  inconvenient details regarding ministerial 
decisions. Arguably, both parties, when faced by the abyss of  
a complete breakdown in their relationship, will come to their 
senses and return to ‘working relationships’. Such processes 
can even be observed in the case of  former ministers. For 
example, when the former UK trade minister Lord (Digby) 
Jones reflected about his ‘dehumanising’ experience as junior 
minister, he suggested that half  of  the civil service should be 
sacked. He later retracted this statement (following audible 
civil service disgruntlement), calling for a ‘more rigorous 
analysis’ of  civil service numbers and suggesting that he had 
not meant to attack the civil servants working directly under 
him in his portfolio, but those operating elsewhere in the 
Department for Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform 
(causing further offence) (Financial Times, 28 January 2009).
The ‘do nothing’ option will also appeal to those who 
believe that the benefits of  any change will be outweighed 
by the costs of  unintended side-effects. 
Nevertheless, a ‘do nothing’ alternative is 
unappealing to those who are looking for 
ways to improve the workings of  the Public 
Service Bargain and who argue that the 
balance of  power between blame-avoiding 
politicians and powerless civil servants does 
not allow for equilibrating tendencies.
So if  ‘back to the future’ is hardly an 
option as society and political systems have 
moved on, and the ‘do nothing’ option is arguably not viable, 
what other options are left? The rest of  this short paper presents 
three dominant reform scenarios. Each has implications for 
understandings that relate to three dimensions of  any Public 
Service Bargain, namely rewards, competencies and loyalty. 
This selection of  scenarios is not meant to provide a fully 
exhaustive or mutually exclusive account, but it does cover 
three main branches of  contemporary public management 
debates. Each scenario seeks to draw out differences rather 
than commonalities to animate discussion. If  each of  the three 
scenarios has some currency and relevance for the future of  
the Bargain, then this suggests that there will hardly be ‘one’ 
Bargain for the future as there is no one single ‘modern’ form 
of  bureaucracy of  the future. Instead, there will be ongoing 
complexification and diversification, with all the scope for 
‘misunderstandings’ that these cause. Indeed, each one of  
these three scenarios generates its own opportunities for the 
different parties to ‘shuffle out’ of  their assumed obligations 
under the Bargain.
The ‘managerialist state’ Public Service Bargain
This narrative diagnoses the key problems in contemporary 
arrangements as a lack of  ‘managerial’ thinking that 
permeates both political and bureaucratic worlds and 
produces inefficiency. Consequently, incentives need to be 
high-powered and well-designed, the autonomy space well 
demarcated and emphasis placed on ‘managerialist’ skills 
and capabilities to run organisations. 
This is to some extent a ‘back to the future’ to the ambitions 
of  the State Sector Act of  1988 and the Public Finance Act 
of  1989. That is, the bargain provides for a greater scope 
of  managerial autonomy for public managers to deliver 
against mutually agreed benchmarks (i.e. outputs and, 
possibly, outcomes). High material rewards await those who 
achieve these targets. Far less reward, if  not unemployment, 
awaits those who fail to deliver. It is a world where stable 
career expectations are replaced by an explicit ‘up or out’ 
management system. To achieve those performance targets, 
skills and capabilities to ‘deliver’ are required with clear 
differences between those bureaucratic activities that are 
concentrated more on the policy and those on the more 
managerial side (for example, human resource, project or 
financial management side). Against those who argue that 
‘policy wonks’ and ‘sages’ within government are unlikely 
to enthusiastically endorse ‘delivery’, this account suggests 
that ‘one more heave’ at designing better incentive systems 
will deal with these problems. Similarly, incentives are seen 
to encourage collaboration among government departments 
rather than merely specialisation and fragmentation. 
In terms of  loyalty understandings, the managerialist 
bargain requires ‘obedience’ rather than loyalty. In 
other words, public servants are instructed to deliver 
(unquestioningly) and are visible to the outside world in terms 
of  being responsible for delivery. Thus, loyalty is understood 
as ‘requirement to deliver’ and being ‘free to manage’ to do 
so.  
The ‘regulatory state’ Public Service Bargain
According to this narrative, the key problem affecting 
politics is discretion. Public servants ‘bureau-shape’, ‘budget-
maximise’ and filter out those activities they dislike. Politicians 
similarly are accused of  pork-barrelling and of  responding to 
incidents in the style of  Pavlov’s dogs in order to receive short-
term applause from their constituencies. These instincts are 
further accentuated by performance-oriented civil servants 
who seek to please their political masters. 
The cure therefore is to juridify the relationship between 
public servants and politicians in the way in which central 
banks or regulatory agencies have been made ‘independent’ 
over the past two decades to take the political ‘time 
inconsistency’ problem out of  particular policy domains, 
while the risk of  ‘administrative expropriation’ is reduced 
through legal procedural devices and focused rather than 
general oversight. Accordingly, this would produce a 
vision of  ever more contractualisation within government, 
accompanied by an army of  watchdogs, waste-watchers 
and other oversight bodies, thereby extending previous 
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attempts at writing down relationships across various parts 
of  the state to ever more aspects. One example of  such an 
initiative was the announcement, in late January 2009, by the 
UK shadow chancellor of  the exchequer, George Osborne, 
that, if  elected, a Conservative government would seek to 
turn the ‘Whitehall supertanker’ by imposing on senior civil 
servants a ‘fiduciary duty’ towards taxpayers to ensure value 
for money. 
If  this scenario were to be realised, Public Service 
Bargains would resemble those that apply to central bankers 
and regulators. In other words, reward would be defined in 
strict terms and not be related to the political preferences 
and priorities of  the government of  the day, but would be 
determined in ways that were not sensitive to political feelings 
and opinion poll standings. In terms of  competency, too, 
the bargain would look very distinct, namely with a very 
strong emphasis on ‘policy wonk’ characteristics, as expert 
judgement is brought to bear on different policy problems 
and constellations. Finally, in terms of  loyalty understandings, 
this Bargain would move away from traditional ‘serial loyalty’ 
(or monogamy) understandings that have been common in 
Whitehall and Wellington and towards a more ‘trustee’-type 
role in which loyalty is paid to specific constitutional values 
and obligations. For example, in competition law it is widely 
the case that those judging cases are to be solely directed by the 
law rather than by the political context of  their decision. Such 
regulatory Bargains would also require an institution to judge 
the decisions by civil servants, as well as an appeal system.
The ‘governance state’ Public Service Bargain
While governance has come to mean many things, the term is 
used here to highlight the intermeshing of  private and public 
spheres of  influence. In other words, authority is shared 
across different actors. Core aspects of  the ‘governance 
state’ are the sharing of  authority and the importance of  
participation, co-governing and negotiation. Delivery of  
outcomes is not achieved through hierarchy alone but is 
dependent on third parties: i.e. delivery occurs through 
‘networks’. The governance state, defined in these terms, is 
about increasing complexity and disputed hierarchy.
In the case of  New Zealand, realisation of  such a 
‘governance state’ would require a full endorsement of  the 
underlying ideas of  MMP rather then begrudging acceptance 
by major party politicians, eager to present themselves in 
presidential or chief  executive terms, and by civil servants, 
discontent with having to see their ‘pure’ policy ideas filtered 
by negotiation between coalition party committees.
Such a world of  a ‘governance state’ raises considerable 
problems for a performance-oriented reward system as 
outcomes, if  not outputs as well, are largely a matter of  third 
party delivery and co-governing. For competency, the key 
aspects here are those that have been termed ‘boundary-
spanning’ skills, namely not the skill to be ‘best in the world’ 
in terms of  in-house expertise or in terms of  providing 
political tactical advice to ministers, but the ability to bridge 
and access differentiated social systems, to ‘translate’ their 
different demands and to bring these systems together 
through negotiated settlements. Such settlements also raise 
distinct issues for loyalty understandings, as the demands of  
long-term problem solving within policy domains conflict 
with traditional ideas of  ‘serial loyalty’ 
to ministerial hierarchy, a problem that 
also applies, for example, to national 
diplomats dealing in international 
negotiations. 
‘Shuffling out’ of the Bargain
If  the Public Service Bargains look 
remarkably different under the three 
different ‘states’, then there are also 
very different ways in which the three Bargains can become 
unstuck by either party seeking to shuffle out. In other words, 
none of  the three scenarios is likely to provide any stability as 
the diverse parties have different incentives to cheat.
Under the ‘managerialist state’ scenario, the terms of  
the Bargain are that of  a ‘thermostat’. Politicians choose the 
desired outcomes and outputs and bureaucrats are free to 
choose the interventions required to achieve these agreed 
targets. However, such a ‘thermostat’ vision of  a Bargain is 
vulnerable on several counts. For one, it is vulnerable to the 
question of  whether performance is really being assessed on 
the agreed targets (regardless of  whether they are meaningful 
indicators of  ‘quality’ or not), or whether managers are ‘free 
to manage’ or must suffer considerable political background 
intervention in their activities. Furthermore, it requires rather 
heroic assumptions as to behavioural implications for the 
manager of  the fear of  non-achievement. For example, likely 
responses to such a regime range from ‘creative compliance’ 
responses (‘hitting the target, but missing the point’) to open 
manipulation of  information. 
Under the ‘regulatory state’ scenario, ideas about 
juridifying relationships seek to reduce ‘cheating’ on the 
bargain, or to make the consequences more explicit. 
However, it is unlikely that this Bargain variant is without its 
opportunities for ‘shuffling out’ behaviours. On the political 
side, politicians are tempted to dispute jurisdiction (branding 
a ‘decision’ as ‘advice’, for example), to launch political 
whispering campaigns doubting the intellectual or mental 
capabilities of  their civil servants, or simply to bypass public 
servants through direct negotiations with constituencies. On 
the public servant side of  the Bargain, shuffling out would be 
characterised by creative interpretation of  objectives through 
activist decision making or in terms of  non-expert decision 
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making (for example, due to ‘capture’). Such Bargains will 
become strained when ministers are told to purchase military 
hardware for half  the price from elsewhere at the expense of  
domestic industry. 2
In the world of  the ‘governance state’, problems of  
shuffling out are also likely to occur. On the political side this 
links to the acceptance of  co-sharing and negotiated power 
instead of  asserting hierarchy, as well as showing little interest 
in including key societal actors in negotiations. On the 
bureaucratic side of  the ‘governance bargain’, shuffling out 
is characterised by showing little interest in comprehensive 
boundary-spanning and by lacking competence in negotiating 
and compromising within networks.
What next?
The discussion of  the different scenarios for a future Public 
Service Bargain was meant to point to discussions regarding 
the nature of  governing in the contemporary state and to 
derive some implications for discussions regarding the 
evolution of  the Public Service Bargain. The intention 
was neither to condemn the past decades of  ‘New Public 
Management’, nor to diagnose any particular problems in 
the case of  New Zealand and offer solutions. Instead, the 
intention was to build on cross-national observations to 
encourage debate regarding the future direction of  Public 
Service Bargains. One of  the advantages of  looking at 
administrative reform ideas through the lens of  the Public 
Service Bargain is that it strengthens awareness that any 
intended action leads to reactive behaviours on both sides of  
the Bargain (i.e. ‘it takes two to tango’), thereby highlighting 
the importance of  strategic adjustments to demands and 
challenges.
The various scenarios or narratives point to diverse, 
partly reinforcing, partly countervailing dynamics that 
are at the heart of  contemporary governing. The three 
scenarios suggest different relationships between politicians 
and public servants. There are also significant differences 
in the understanding of  reward, competency and loyalty. 
Therefore, it is unlikely that the future will be characterised 
by any one ‘mutually beneficial bargain’. The future of  the 
Public Service Bargain may therefore lie in the multiplication 
of  Bargains rather than a convergence into any one particular 
‘paradigm’. Accordingly, different Public Service Bargains 
would explicitly operate side by side, with considerable 
overlap, also especially with those Bargains that apply to 
political advisers (who have not been considered here). 
Multiplication and diversification should not, however, 
be confused with a reduced centrality of  Public Service 
Bargains within executive government. Although ideas 
regarding national stereotypes of  one single ‘Public Service 
Bargain’ may require reconsideration, the underlying 
analytical ideas are arguably more critical than ever in order 
to understand the relationship between public servants and 
the wider political system. That is, expectations regarding 
rewards, competency and loyalty remain central in executive 
government, although how these expectations are constituted 
will increasingly depend on individual location within the 
executive. The value of  the Public Service Bargain idea is 
that it is able to offer a fine-grained perspective on individual 
Public Service Bargains as an exchange relationship with the 
wider political system, and puts the emphasis in the study of  
reform in executive government on the effect on relationships 
rather than on announcements.
In sum, the future of  the Public Service Bargain is unlikely 
to be uniform, and it is also unlikely to be stable. Multiplication 
makes sense if  it is accepted that varied demands on the state 
require a varied response by the state. Such multiplication, 
however, also brings with it considerable scope for confusion 
and misunderstandings, along with the inherent tendencies 
within individual Public Service Bargains for one or more 
parties to shuffle out. Rules and constitutions are unlikely 
to deal with such shuffling out; instead, such behaviour can 
only be somewhat contained through shared understandings 
and conventions. However, such shared agreements require 
highly peculiar conditions, and it is questionable how feasible 
or durable such conditions can be in a world of  an increasingly 
heterogeneous public service, and blame-avoiding politics in 
which politicians are said to feel permanently under siege.
1 Two years later, the Ottawa Citizen headlined a story: ‘Hostility between politicians and PS 
hits new high, adviser says’ (23 February 2008).
2 One example of such strain emerged in late January 2009 in the UK. The cost of a new 
national computer system for the National Health Service had increased sevenfold to 
£13bn. It was alleged that civil servants chose not to follow appropriate cost-benefit 
procedures at the outset of the scheme in order not to embarrass a prime-ministerial 
flagship announcement by indicating that costs were likely to outweigh benefits (Financial 
Times, 28 January 2009).
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